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Objective. To determine the predictors of chain acquisition among independent di-
alysis providers.
Data Sources. Retrospective facility-level data combined from CMS Cost Reports,
Medical Evidence Forms, Annual Facility Surveys, and claims for 1996–2003.
Study Design. Independent dialysis facilities’ probability of acquisition by a dialysis
chain (overall and by chain size) was estimated using a discrete time hazard rate model,
controlling for financial and clinical performance, practice patterns, market factors, and
other facility characteristics.
Data Collection. The sample includes all U.S. freestanding dialysis facilities that
report not being chain affiliated for at least 1 year between 1997 and 2003.
Principal Findings. Above-average costs and better quality outcomes are significant
determinants of dialysis chain acquisition. Facilities in larger markets were more likely to
be acquired by a chain. Furthermore, small dialysis chains have different acquisition
strategies than large chains.
Conclusions. Dialysis chains appear to employ a mix of turn-around and cream-
skimming strategies. Poor financial health is a predictor of chain acquisition as in other
health care sectors, but the increased likelihood of chain acquisition among higher
quality facilities is unique to the dialysis industry. Significant differences among pre-
dictors of acquisition by small and large chains reinforce the importance of using a richer
classification for chain status.
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The last two decades have seen dramatic growth in the size and number of
chain organizations in several health care sectors, including hospitals, nursing
homes, and outpatient kidney dialysis facilities (Banaszak-Holl et al. 2002;
Cuellar and Gertler 2003; U.S. Renal Data System 2008). In particular, chain-
affiliated dialysis centers increased from 14 percent of the market in 1988 to 66
percent in 2006 (U.S. Renal Data System 2005; 2008). The rationale for this
growth includes a variety of potential economic benefits of chain membership




(e.g., improved resource allocation, standardization of services, increased
market power, and presence) that promote higher quality and lead to econ-
omies of scale and scope (Pautler 2003). Nonetheless, concerns have been
raised regarding reductions in competition and removal of local control.
The financial benefits associated with chain membership may be espe-
cially salient in the payment environment faced by dialysis providers. Because
almost all dialysis patients become Medicare eligible after their first 90 days of
dialysis,1 Medicare pays for the vast majority of dialysis sessions. Medicare
uses a mixed payment methodology for dialysis-related services, the majority
of which is a prospective payment covering a specified bundle of services with
a cap on the number of weekly sessions. The payment rate has received only
minor updates since being introduced in 1983.2 The remaining payment cov-
ers items that dialysis facilities are allowed to bill on a fee-for-service basis
separately from the prospective bundle, primarily injectable medications and
laboratory tests. The average Medicare payment per dialysis session was
U.S.$202 in 2000, U.S.$125 of which was prospectively paid (Hirth et al.
2003).
Acquisition by a chain may yield several direct financial benefits for both
the acquired facility and acquiring chain. Facilities gain access to the chain’s
volume discounts for medications; this is particularly important in the context
of Epogen (EPO), a synthetic form of the hormone erythropoietin used to treat
anemia (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 2002), manufactured
solely by Amgen (Thamer et al. 2007).3 Facilities also gain access to the chain’s
centralized clinical laboratories, presenting another opportunity for financial
gain relative to performing low volumes of laboratory work or sending such
work to nonaffiliated labs. Meanwhile, by spreading fixed costs (e.g., medical
records systems) across more patients, the chain may also benefit from new
acquisitions if the average cost faced by chain-affiliated facilities falls. With a
larger total patient base, the chain may be able to offer additional services (e.g.,
one chain-affiliated facility may serve all of the chain’s peritoneal dialysis
patients in the market).4 This joint production of different dialysis modalities
translates to economies of scope and more treatment options for the patient.
Less direct benefits include accessing the chain’s skill at improving care
through best practice guidelines and advanced information systems.
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Conversely, several factors may counter the potential benefits of acqui-
sitions from the chain’s perspective. A facility owner may have local capabil-
ities (e.g., long-standing relationships with patients, staff, and area providers)
that cannot readily be transferred to outside owners. Independent ownership
also may reduce the difficulty in monitoring staff performance, and owner/
managers may have stronger incentives for efficiency. From the independent
facility owner’s perspective, the loss of autonomy might outweigh the benefits
of affiliating with a chain.
From a broader societal perspective, the primary policy concerns re-
garding chain growth are increases in market concentration and accompany-
ing decreases in patient choice. In 2006, 60 percent of dialysis patients
received care from a facility owned by one of the two largest chains (U.S.
Renal Data System 2008). Furthermore, mergers during 2004 through 2006
consolidated the six largest chains into just two (U.S. Renal Data System 2008).
Additionally, chains may overcharge if they gain monopoly power. De-
mand for dialysis-related care is fairly price inelastic because the only alter-
natives are kidney transplantation or hospice. These monopolies may earn
positive economic profits by demanding prices above costs from payers other
than Medicare who cannot mandate payment ceilings. In 1999, Gambro, the
second largest dialysis provider at the time, was accused of implementing this
type of price discrimination after acquiring six dialysis facilities in western
Michigan (Taylor 1999). Shortly after the acquisitions, Gambro enacted non-
compete clauses and exclusive contracts with area nephrologists, followed by
a nearly five-fold increase in prices charged to private insurers. Meanwhile,
Gambro facilities in similar geographical areas without monopoly control did
not alter their price structures. Even in the Medicare market where prices are
fixed, nonprice competition is relevant as dialysis facilities may be able to
exploit market power by decreasing services or amenities to increase profits
(Held and Pauly 1983), or by reducing choices available to patients regarding
both clinical and nonclinical aspects of care.
Despite the continued growth of chains in the dialysis industry and their
potential effects on cost, quality, and price, little research has examined factors
associated with chain acquisition. Therefore, this article attempts to answer the
following questions:
 What characteristics make an independent dialysis facility a more
likely target for acquisition by a chain?
 Do small and large chains target different types of independent
dialysis facilities for acquisition?
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 Are predictors of chain acquisition among dialysis providers similar
to predictors of chain acquisition in other health care sectors (i.e.,
nursing homes and hospitals)?
PREVIOUS RESEARCH
Chain acquisitions have been well studied in other health care sectors. Among
the motives for acquisition, many studies support a ‘‘turn-around’’ theory
regarding acquisition strategy. Using hospital financial conditions to predict
their likelihood of acquisition by a chain, McCue and Furst (1986) and Menke
(1997) found that chains purchased hospitals that were financially distressed.
Phillips (1999) found similar results for nonprofit hospitals acquired by for-
profit chains, and financial uncertainty was also a reason cited in Blumenthal
and Weissman’s (2000) case study of three teaching hospitals purchased by
for-profit chains. More recently, Sloan, Ostermann, and Conover (2003)
found that low profit margin was an important antecedent to hospital own-
ership conversion.
In the nursing home sector, Banaszak-Holl et al. (2002) found that homes
with more health deficiencies are more likely to be acquired by chains than
those with better quality indicators. Although perhaps less applicable to the
dialysis industry than results based on other health care sectors, Danzon,
Epstein, and Nicholson (2004) also found financial trouble (i.e., low expected
growth rate of earnings) to be a precursor to mergers among pharmaceutical
companies.
Research on the dialysis industry has also used chain status to predict
such outcomes as cost, practice patterns, and quality, and it can provide some
guidance as to the factors that may predict acquisition by a chain. Most studies
measure chain status as a binary characteristic, rather than allowing for differ-
ences between large and small or national and regional chains, and have
reported insignificant chain effects or only cursorily discussed chain effects
(Schlesinger, Cleary, and Blumenthal 1989; Griffiths et al. 1994; Hirth, Cher-
new, and Orzol 2000). Research using richer definitions of chain affiliation
(e.g., chain size) has found significant differences between chains and inde-
pendent dialysis facilities and among chain types in impact on economies of
scale, costs, and efficiency. Using seven classes of chain affiliation, Dor, Held,
and Pauly (1992) found that all but one of the larger chains had lower costs
than chains with fewer units, and Hirth et al. (1999) also reported differences in
costs between large and small chains. Similarly, Ozgen and Ozcan (2002)
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observed significant differences in efficiency across six chain categories com-
pared with independent providers. Finally, Thamer et al. (2007) found marked
differences in EPO utilization across the six major chains and in chains relative
to independents.
Research on other health care industries also reveals significant differ-
ences when chain status is modeled as a multicategory variable. For example,
Tennyson and Fottler (2000) found a significant association between chain
affiliation and hospital financial performance when differentiating between
national and regional hospital systems; the association was insignificant when
a binary variable for chain status was used instead. Within the nursing home
literature, Banaszak-Holl et al. (2002) found significant differences between
three levels of chain size and the number of nursing home residents with
pressure ulcers. Together, these findings suggest that using a simple binary
variable for chain affiliation is inadequate and may bias results.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Assuming that both the dialysis chain and the independent dialysis facility are
profit maximizers, each will decide whether or not to engage in a chain ac-
quisition. The independent facility’s owners will set a minimum price (Pf) that
they are willing to accept from a chain. Pf reflects the net present value (NPV)




ðRevenueif  CostifÞ=ð1þ rfÞi ¼ Pf ð1Þ
The chain will set a maximum price (Pc) that it is willing to offer to the
facility. Pc reflects the NPV of the facility’s profit under the chain’s ownership,




ðRevenueic  CosticÞ=ð1þ rcÞi ¼ Pc ð2Þ
A chain acquisition will occur only when Pc4Pf, which is necessary for
the existence of an acquisition price that benefits both the buyer and the seller.
In other words, an ‘‘event’’ (i.e., acquisition by a chain) will occur only when
both firms expect an economic gain, regardless of chain size. However, chain
size may affect aspects of the relative value of an acquisition (e.g., joining a
larger chain may result in greater volume purchasing discounts).
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Under a ‘‘turn-around’’ strategy, the chain perceives the facility to be
underperforming (i.e., Costif in equation (1) is too high); accordingly, the
chain will increase the facility’s profitability by reducing cost post acquisition.
Alternatively, ‘‘cream skimming’’ implies that chains perceive the facility to be
well-performing and will focus on increasing revenue streams (i.e., Revenueic
in equation [2]) post acquisition to increase the facility’s profitability. That is,
although both strategies result in increased profitability post acquisition, turn
around focuses on reducing inefficient costs whereas cream skimming focuses
on improving revenues.
The decision to sell is relatively straightforward when owners are
passive investors motivated by financial gain, but it may become complicated
by nonprofit ownership of a minority of facilities and nonfinancial issues
for owners actively involved in the operations of the facility who do not
want to give up control in the facility’s day-to-day operations or want to reduce
their work hours (Riley and McGraw-Walsh 2006). Nonpecuniary issues are




Chain affiliation, financial characteristics, practice patterns, market factors,
payer mix, and facility size were collected from Medicare cost reports for
freestanding dialysis facilities (Form CMS-265-94) submitted for 1996–2003.
The Annual Facility Survey (Form CMS-2744) provided facility age, geo-
graphical setting, ownership type, and market factors. Medicare physician/
supplier and institutional claims and Medical Evidence Forms (Form CMS-
2728) were used to calculate patient characteristics and clinical outcomes at
each facility, and data from the National Conference of State Legislatures’
(NCSL) website was used to determine which states had certificate of need
(CON) laws (NCSL 2009). Kidney Epidemiology and Cost Center (2005) and
CMS (2007) describe these data sources in more detail. Predictor variables
were lagged 1 year to control for contemporaneous effects, and subsequently,
results use only 7 years (1997–2003).
A weighted average, based on the fraction of the reporting period in each
year, was used for the few cost reports that spanned two calendar years. Hos-
pital-based facilities, comprising 17 percent of dialysis facilities in 2006 (U.S.
Renal Data System 2008), were excluded because their cost reports do not
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provide information on chain ownership. However, these facilities were in-
cluded in calculations of dialysis market characteristics.
Measures
Dependent Variable. Two specifications of the dependent variable were used.
First, chain acquisition was coded as binary, with ‘‘1’’ indicating an indepen-
dent facility acquired in that calendar year versus ‘‘0’’ if it remained indepen-
dent. Second, acquisition was coded separately for acquisitions by ‘‘large’’
(i.e., one of the five largest chains) and ‘‘small’’ (i.e., all other chains) chains.
Between 1997 and 2003, the large chains ranged in size from 104 to 1,046,
and the small chains ranged in size from 2 to 90.
Independent Variables. The likelihood of an independent dialysis facility’s
being acquired by a chain is hypothesized to be a function of the following:
 Facility Financial Performance. We use a facility’s efficiency, as mea-
sured by the average composite rate (CR) cost/treatment (adjusted to
2003 dollars), to test for whether poor financial performance affects
likelihood of acquisition. Higher costs of delivering these prospec-
tively paid services are expected to make acquisition more likely
under a ‘‘turn around’’ hypothesis because of the implied opportu-
nity for cost reduction (i.e., Costic in equation [2] will be lower post-
acquisition). Facility age (years since Medicare certification) proxies
for capital depreciation and may lead to a chain implementing a turn-
around strategy using expertise and buying power to upgrade capital
stock. Age is not an ideal measure because it can also indicate ‘‘sur-
vival’’ as an independent or proxy for other factors that may reduce
the incentive to either acquire or sell.
 Practice Patterns. Two staffing practice measures were included:
staffing intensity (measured as nurse-to-patient ratio) and percent of
skilled labor (measured as percent of labor comprised of doctors and
nurses). Facilities with a low percentage of skilled staff may be less
desirable to patients and payers than those employing more nurses
and doctors, but providing higher-skilled labor is more costly. Sub-
sequently, the effect of staffing on acquisition is ambiguous. A binary
variable indicating whether a facility offers only hemodialysis (i.e.,
does not offer peritoneal or home dialysis) was also included. Chains
can ‘‘turn around’’ facilities with only hemodialysis by expanding the
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service line to include alternative dialysis treatment options. There-
fore, offering only hemodialysis is expected to make a facility a more
attractive target since the chains’ revenues (Revenueic in equation
[2]) is expected to increase post acquisition. We also included the
number of dialysis stations per patient. Higher values are a measure
of amenity from the patient perspective because of the potential for
greater flexibility in scheduling dialysis sessions, but an inefficiency
from the facility perspective because higher values imply less inten-
sive use of a fixed input. Given these divergent viewpoints, its effect
on the probability of acquisition is an empirical question. Finally, we
used a binary variable indicating whether a facility reuses dialyzers.
This is a cost-saving practice that also lowers quality (Fan et al. 2005;
Robinson and Feldman 2005), making its expected effect on acqui-
sition ambiguous.
 Clinical Performance. We used the percent of patients achieving the
Kidney Disease Outcomes Quality Initiative’s (K/DOQI) recom-
mendations for anemia management (hematocrit [HCT]  33 per-
cent) as a measure of clinical performance. Because diseased
kidneys do not produce enough hormones to stimulate red blood
cell production, anemia (low HCT) is widespread among dialysis
patients. Genetically engineered EPO is an effective treatment.
Coupled with the EPO’s previously discussed profitability, a
‘‘turn-around’’ hypothesis suggests that fewer patients meeting the
K/DOQI guidelines will make acquisition more likely (i.e., the
chains’ revenues, Revenueic in equation [2], is expected to increase
post acquisition).
 Market Factors. We controlled for market size using the number of
facilities in the market (defined as the 50-mile radius around each
facility’s zip code) and market concentration (Herfindahl–Hirsch-
man Index [HHI]).5 All facilities in the market owned by the same
chain were treated as one firm in the HHI calculation.
As previously mentioned, hospital-based dialysis facilities are in-
cluded in these market variable calculations. However, chain status
for these facilities is unavailable until 2001, so they are treated
as independents for the 1997–2000 HHI calculations. To adjust
for this potential overestimate of competition, the percent of hospital-
based treatments in the market was also included as a control
variable.
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 Other Facility Characteristics. Facility size (total number of dialysis
treatments) was used to capture scale economies. The percent of
Medicare patients was included because the price charged to private
insurers is higher than the Medicare payment rate, so it is likely that
chains and facilities consider the payer mix in their Pc and Pf, re-
spectively. If chains are better at negotiating payment rates with
private insurers, a higher percentage of privately insured patients will
increase the likelihood of acquisition. We also controlled for preac-
quisition ownership status (nonprofit versus for-profit), geographic
setting (rural versus urban), year, presence of CON law, and ESRD
network affiliation.6
 Patient Characteristics. Covariates that control for patient population
differences across facilities included average patient age, percent
African American, percent in first year of dialysis, patient size (mea-
sured by the mean body surface area of patients), percent of under-
weight patients (measured as patients with a body mass index
o18.5 kg/m2), and the percentages of patients who are HIV posi-
tive, drug dependent, or with histories of myocardial infarction (MI),
pericarditis, or peripheral vascular disease (PVD). These comorbid-
ities and weight measures were significant predictors of facility costs
in previous dialysis-related research (Kidney Epidemiology and Cost
Center 2005).
Missing covariate values for single years were imputed using the facility’s
mean value on a measure.7 If chain status was missing, the preceding and
following years’ values on the variable were compared. If they matched, the
missing year was assigned that value. When the values differed, the missing
year was assigned ‘‘No’’ for chain affiliation so that it would not be the event
year. If more than two consecutive years of data were missing for a facility,
values were not imputed and subsequent facility-year observations also were
omitted from the sample. Results were not sensitive to the missing year im-
putations and methodology.
Methods
A discrete time hazard model was employed to predict the probability that a
chain acquired a dialysis facility in any year between 1997 and 2003 (Allison
1982; 1995). The unit of observation was facility-year. A facility was included
in the sample until it was acquired or lost to follow-up.
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¼ ait þ Xitb ð3Þ
in which each facility i is acquired by a chain at time t, given that it has not
already been acquired. Xit represents the independent variables listed above.
A multinomial logistic model was used to predict factors affecting acquisition
by either a small or large chain. The effect of the covariates (b) was interpreted
as the change in the log odds of being acquired associated with a one-unit
change in the covariate. All continuous variables are standardized, so that a
one-unit change in a covariate corresponds to its respective standard deviation
(SD) with other covariates held at their mean.
RESULTS
Of the 3,978 unique freestanding dialysis facilities submitting cost reports
during 1997–2003, 920 (23 percent) were independent at some time during
that period, which would place them at risk of being acquired by a chain and
eligible for inclusion in the analysis. Forty-five percent of these facilities
(N 5 411/920) was acquired by a chain during the study period: 166 by small
chains and the remaining 245 by large chains.8 Together, these 920 unique
dialysis facilities correspond to 3,351 facility-years over the 7-year span (this
does not include years post acquisition).
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics, overall and by acquisition status.
Tables 2 and 3 show the multivariate results. For the two categorical covariates
(network and year), odds ratios are not of particular interest because the
comparison is only relative to the omitted category. Therefore, only results
from the likelihood ratio tests of joint significance are reported for these two
variables.
Significant Predictors of Dialysis Chain Acquisition
The results in Table 2 indicate that poor financial performance predicted
acquisition. Holding other covariates constant, a U.S.$75.86 (1 SD) increase in
CR cost/treatment was associated with a 25 percent increase in the odds of
being acquired. Older facilities, which may have relatively out-of-date capital
stock or unmeasured factors correlated with an owner’s lack of desire to sell or
undesirability as a target, had lower odds of acquisition. Only one of the
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics, Overall and by Acquisition
Dialysis Facility Characteristics
All Independent
Facilities N 5 3,351 Acquired by Chain?
Mean
or % SD
No N 5 2,940
Mean or %
Yes N 5 411
Mean or %
Facility financial performance
CR cost/treatment (2003 dollar) 169.80 75.86 168.72 177.49
Facility age (years) 6.14 6.26 6.27 5.18
Practice patterns
Staffing intensity (RN-to-pt ratio) 0.1 0.22 0.1 0.1
% Skilled labor 32 14 32 31
Stations per pt 0.3 0.22 0.3 0.29
Offer hemodialysis only (% of facilities) 53 —— 53 49
Reuse dialyzers (% of facilities) 75 —— 74 76
Clinical performance
% of pts with HCT  33% 61 26 62 59
Market factors (market 5 50-mile radius)
HHI 2,380 1,836 2,403 2,220
Market size (treatments in 1,000s) 596 793 599 573
% HB facilities in market 15 18 15 15
Other facility characteristics
Facility size (treatments in 1,000s)n 10.16 8.55 10.13 10.35
% Medicare treatments 74 16 74 75
For-profit (% of facilities) 89 —— 89 93
Rural (% of facilities) 23 —— 23 22
CON (% of facilities) 21 —— 22 16
Pt characteristics
% of pts with HIV1 diagnosis 1 5 1 2
% of pts with PVD diagnosis 40 13 40 41
% of pts with pericarditis diagnosis 2 3 2 2
% of pts with drug dependence diagnosis 2 3 2 2
% of pts with MI diagnosis 15 9 15 13
% of pts o18 years old 0 1 0 0
% of pts 18–44 years 16 9 16 17
% of pts 45–59 years 26 9 26 25
% of pts 60–69 years 24 8 24 25
% of pts 70–79 years 24 10 24 24
% of pts 801 years 10 7 10 9
% African American pts 29 27 29 33
% female pts 48 10 47 48
% pts underweight (BMIo18.5 kg/m2) 6 5 6 6
BSA 1.82 0.06 1.82 1.82
% pts in first year of dialysis 32 18 32 34
Notes. 3,351 facility-year observations correspond to 920 unique independent facilities, which can
appear up to seven times (1997–2003) in the model.
nAssuming three treatments per week per patient, average facility size corresponds to approx-
imately 67 patient-years per facility-year observation.
BMI, body mass index; BSA, body surface area; CR, composite rate; CON, certificate of need;
HB, hospital-based; HCT, hematocrit; HHI, Herfindahl–Hirschman Index; MI, myocardial in-
farction; PVD, peripheral vascular disease; pt, patient.
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Intercept 0.09 0.04 0.18nnn
Facility financial performance
CR cost/treatment (2003 dollar) 1.25 1.05 1.48nn
Facility age (years) 0.85 0.73 0.98n
Practice patterns
Staffing intensity 1.05 0.93 1.19
% skilled labor 0.96 0.83 1.11
Stations per pt 0.83 0.70 0.99n
Offer hemodialysis only (reference 5 N ) 0.79 0.61 1.04
Reuse dialyzers (reference 5 N ) 1.10 0.81 1.49
Clinical performance
% of pts with HCT  33% 1.30 1.10 1.54nn
Market factors (market 5 50-mile radius)
HHI 0.88 0.73 1.07
Market size (treatments in 1,000s) 1.43 1.09 1.88nn
% HB facilities in market 1.03 0.86 1.25
Other facility characteristics
Facility size (treatments in 1,000s) 1.15 0.98 1.35
% Medicare treatments 0.93 0.80 1.08
For-profit (reference 5 N ) 1.42 0.91 2.24
Rural (reference 5 N ) 1.15 0.81 1.62
CON (reference 5 N ) 1.56 0.96 2.52
Pt characteristics
% of pts with HIV1 diagnosis 1.10 1.00 1.22n
% of pts with PVD diagnosis 1.22 1.04 1.42n
% of pts with pericarditis diagnosis 1.03 0.91 1.15
% of pts with drug dependence diagnosis 0.92 0.79 1.06
% of pts with MI diagnosis 0.88 0.76 1.03
% of pts o18 years old 0.93 0.79 1.10
% of pts 18–44 years 0.84 0.69 1.02
% of pts 45–59 years 0.80 0.66 0.97n
% of pts 60–69 years (reference)
% of pts 70–79 years 0.90 0.74 1.09
% of pts 801 years 0.97 0.81 1.15
% African American pts 1.14 0.97 1.34
% female pts 1.04 0.89 1.21
% pts underweight (BMIo18.5 kg/m2) 1.05 0.91 1.21
BSA 1.08 0.90 1.28
% pts in first year of dialysis 1.03 0.88 1.21
Likelihood ratio test of categorical variables
Year nnn
Network nnn
Notes. Significantly different from zero at: n0.05 level; nn0.01 level; nnn0.001 level.
All continuous variables are standardized, so a one-unit change in the covariate corresponds to its
respective SD, with other covariates held at their mean.
BMI, body mass index; BSA, body surface area; CR, composite rate; CON, certificate of need;
HB, hospital-based; HCT, hematocrit; HHI, Herfindahl–Hirschman Index; MI, myocardial in-
farction; PVD, peripheral vascular disease; pt, patient.
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Table 3: Odds Ratios and 95% Confidence Intervals (CI) with Multinomial
Chain Outcome
Acquisition by a Small Chainw Acquisition by a Large Chainw
95% CI 95% CI
Variable Odds Ratio Lower Upper Odds Ratio Lower Upper
Facility financial performance
CR cost/treatment (2003 dollar) 1.27 0.98 1.64 1.23 0.99 1.53
Facility age (years) 0.87 0.69 1.09 0.83 0.69 1.00n
Practice patterns
Staffing intensity 1.18 1.01 1.39n 0.97 0.80 1.17
% Skilled labor 0.97 0.78 1.20 0.96 0.80 1.16
Stations per pt 0.71 0.53 0.94nn 0.92 0.74 1.13
Offer hemodialysis only (reference 5 N ) 1.02 0.67 1.53 0.68 0.49 0.95n
Reuse dialyzers (reference 5 N ) 1.49 0.90 2.47 0.96 0.66 1.39
Clinical performance
% of pts with HCT  33% 1.23 0.95 1.60 1.30 1.06 1.61nn
Market factors (market 5 50-mile radius)
HHI 0.79 0.59 1.07 0.98 0.76 1.25
Market size (treatments in 1,000s) 1.59 1.01 2.51n 1.36 0.98 1.90
% HB facilities in market 1.06 0.81 1.40 1.02 0.80 1.31
Other facility characteristics
Facility size (treatments in 1,000s) 1.37 1.08 1.73nn 1.04 0.85 1.28
% Medicare treatments 0.81 0.66 1.00n 1.06 0.86 1.30
For-profit (reference 5 N ) 1.67 0.82 3.38 1.37 0.78 2.42
Rural (reference 5 N ) 1.90 1.16 3.11nn 0.76 0.47 1.21
CON (reference 5 N ) 1.33 0.68 2.61n 1.88 0.99 3.60
Pt characteristics
% of pts with HIV1 diagnosis 1.17 1.04 1.33nn 1.04 0.89 1.21
% of pts with PVD diagnosis 1.16 0.92 1.47 1.23 1.01 1.49n
% of pts with pericarditis diagnosis 1.14 0.98 1.34 0.95 0.81 1.11
% of pts with drug dependence diagnosis 0.84 0.65 1.08 0.96 0.81 1.14
% of pts with MI diagnosis 0.91 0.73 1.14 0.86 0.70 1.06
% of pts o18 years old 0.96 0.75 1.21 0.93 0.75 1.15
% of pts 18–44 years 0.82 0.61 1.09 0.83 0.66 1.06
% of pts 45–59 years 0.83 0.62 1.09 0.76 0.59 0.98n
% of pts 60–69 years (reference)
% of pts 70–79 years 0.96 0.72 1.27 0.85 0.66 1.09
% of pts 801 years 1.02 0.79 1.31 0.91 0.73 1.14
% African American pts 1.05 0.81 1.35 1.19 0.97 1.47
% female pts 1.11 0.89 1.39 0.97 0.80 1.18
% pts underweight (BMIo18.5 kg/m2) 0.97 0.77 1.22 1.11 0.94 1.32
BSA 1.10 0.84 1.44 1.05 0.84 1.30
% pts in first year of dialysis 1.11 0.88 1.40 1.00 0.81 1.22
Likelihood ratio test of categorical variables
Year nnn
Network nnn
Notes. Significantly different from zero at: n0.05 level; nn0.01 level; nnn0.001 level.
wReference category for dependent variable is ‘‘not acquired.’’ 166 and 245 facilities were acquired
by small and large chains, respectively.
All continuous variables are standardized, so a one-unit change in the covariate corresponds to its
respective SD, with other covariates held at their mean.
BMI, body mass index; BSA, body surface area; CR, composite rate; CON, certificate of need;
HB, hospital-based; HCT, hematocrit; HHI, Herfindahl–Hirschman Index; MI, myocardial in-
farction; PVD, peripheral vascular disease; pt, patient.
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practice pattern variables——stations per patient——significantly predicted chain
acquisition. Facilities with more stations per patient were less likely to be
acquired by a chain. Facilities with better clinical performance were signifi-
cantly more likely to be acquired by a chain than facilities with poor outcomes.
Specifically, a 26 percent (1 SD) increase in patients with HCT  33 percent
increased odds of chain acquisition by 30 percent.
Facilities in larger markets were significantly more likely to be acquired
than those in smaller markets, but the level of competition (as measured by
HHI) did not predict acquisition. The network and year dummy variables
were significant as a group, reflecting geographic concentration of acquisitions
(e.g., over a third of acquisitions occurred in just three of the 18 ESRD net-
works) and a steady yearly decline in number of acquisitions, respectively. No
other facility characteristics (i.e., facility size, payer mix, ownership status,
rural versus urban status and presence of CON) were significant predictors of
acquisition at the po.05 level.
Differences in Predictors of Acquisition Based on Dialysis Chain Size
Table 3 presents the predictors of acquisition by a small versus large chain; the
reference category is ‘‘not acquired.’’ Having fewer stations per patient and
higher staffing intensity made acquisition by a small chain more likely. Larger
markets and facilities, fewer Medicare patients, and a rural setting also in-
creased the likelihood of acquisition by a small chain.
A facility’s clinical performance was not a significant predictor of small
chain acquisition despite being highly significant in the binomial model.
However, the odds ratios in the two models presented in Table 3 are similar,
and the percent of patients with HCT  33 percent remained a significant
determinant for large chain acquisition. Like the binomial model results, older
facilities also had significantly lower odds of acquisition by a large chain. The
only other facility characteristic significantly associated with acquisition by a
large chain was whether the facility offers multiple modalities: facilities that
only offered hemodialysis were significantly less likely to be acquired by a
large chain than facilities that offered multiple modalities. The effect of market
size was similar in magnitude to results from the binomial model (odds ratios
were 1.43 for all acquisitions versus 1.36 for acquisition by a large chain,
respectively); however, the market size effect was not quite significant in the
multinomial model (p 5 .06). This may be due in part to the smaller number of
events observed in this model and to the corresponding larger standard errors
in each of the two acquisition categories.
Chain Acquisition among Independent Dialysis Facilities 489
DISCUSSION
Similar to previous research from the nursing home and hospital industries,
poor financial health predicts acquisition by a dialysis chain. However, unlike
findings in other health care sectors that examine the effect of quality indi-
cators on the likelihood of acquisition, dialysis chains were more likely to
acquire facilities that had better quality outcomes (higher percent of patients
achieving HCT targets). Taken together, the results suggest a mixed logic
motivating dialysis chain acquisitions that differs slightly from the ‘‘turn-
around’’ hypothesis supported in the nursing home and hospital literatures.
Opportunities to reduce costs and improve revenues by enhancing clinical
performance through additional use of EPO may motivate both the corporate
chains and the facilities themselves to engage in acquisition: higher HCT levels
result from using more EPO; in turn, using more EPO may yield a lower price
from Amgen. Chains may be more able than independent providers to obtain
volume discounts and hence, to engage in strategic use of EPO to improve
clinical performance. Relative to our conceptual model, the acquisition of low-
performing facilities is likely to imply that their value under independent
ownership was low relative to their potential value as part of a chain.
This discrepancy also might arise from different industry characteristics.
Most of the studies that support a ‘‘turn-around’’ strategy for hospitals use
data from 1980 to 2000, a period when the industry was declining. Mean-
while, the dialysis industry has been steadily growing to accommodate the
increasing patient base. Given the increasing supply of facilities, chains oper-
ating in expanding industries may focus less on the potential to reduce cost (i.e.,
turn around) than chains in nongrowth industries while also directing their
efforts toward increasing revenue streams that can be realized from already
well-performing facilities (i.e., cream skimming). In the case of acquisitions of
high-performing facilities, the net value from an acquisition is likely driven less
by underperformance (resulting in depressed value under independent own-
ership) than by the chain placing high value on the revenue stream as part of its
overall growth strategy. Additionally, there are no direct substitutes for dialysis
centers as there are for both hospitals and nursing homes (e.g., outpatient
surgical centers, assisted living facilities, home health agencies).
As in previous studies examining acquisitions by small versus large chains,
we found significant differences in acquisition strategy between differently sized
chains. It may be that larger chains pursue broader national or geographically
differentiated strategies when acquiring units, whereas smaller chains stay focused
on the local facility’s advantages and location (i.e., facilities near their existing
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locations). Our finding——that more factors predict acquisition by a smaller chain
than by a larger chain——suggests that smaller dialysis chains target specific
facilities while larger chains pursue firm growth per se. However, the main differ-
ence between acquisitions by a small versus a large chain is one of degree. For
example, both sizes of chains may offer bulk purchasing discounts, but the savings
may be greater with larger chains, which (all other things being equal) would
increase the achieved gain in value relative to acquisition by a smaller chain.
Future analyses could compare the effects of growth strategies on acquisition
of units already chain owned as compared with acquisition of independent fa-
cilities as well as geographical differences in large versus small chain growth.
Additionally, measuring the distance from the target to the nearest facility that is
already owned by the acquiring chain could help explain the different acquisition
strategy between chains (e.g., if the distance is greater for large chains than small
chains, it would support our theory that the latter are more interested in proximity).
Our future research agenda also includes incorporating more informa-
tion about the acquirers; in particular, how a chain’s presence affects its market
power after an acquisition (e.g., a chain that already owns a facility in the
market will gain more market power through an acquisition than would an-
other chain that has no presence). However, this complicates the analysis be-
cause any independent facility would be at risk of being acquired by the 91
unique chains in operation during the study period, and each of the chains
acquiring the independent facility would need to be treated as a distinct type of
event being predicted (i.e., 91 chains for each of the 3,351 observations). This
analysis may detect interesting and important acquisition strategies among the
different chains, but it is beyond the scope of our current research.
There are several limitations to our findings. First, chain data were not
available for hospital-based dialysis facilities and they were excluded from the
analysis. However, hospital-based facilities make up a relatively small pro-
portion of the entire industry, and to the extent that their financial charac-
teristics and practice patterns are similar to freestanding facilities, providers
may still be able to glean information from these findings. Second, we only
examined acquisition of independent facilities from 1997 to 2003 when the
dialysis industry was growing, so results may not be applicable to other time
periods or to other markets that are stagnant or declining. Third, we assumed
that all chains and independent dialysis facility owners are profit maximizers.
Given that 75 percent of all dialysis units are for-profit (U.S. Renal
Data System 2008) and 86 percent of independent facilities in our dataset
are for-profit, this assumption is not problematic for the majority of our sam-
ple. However, some buyers (e.g., the fifth largest chain in 2004 was nonprofit)
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and sellers may focus on different consequences of chain acquisition. For in-
stance, some independent dialysis owners may be nearing retirement and
looking to cut back on their workload, while others may be new to the industry
and interested in gaining the managerial help and efficiency offered by chains.
As one author observes, ‘‘the decision to sell one’s business is very personal . . .’’
(Riley and McGraw-Walsh 2006, p. 65). Unfortunately, the seller’s age, expe-
rience, and other demographic information are not available. Additionally,
although using the number of dialysis treatments may appear more like a
measure of output than a measurement of facility size, this is the standard
approach taken in dialysis research literature and is significantly and strongly
correlated with other measures of size (i.e., staffing and dialysis stations).
Therefore, we feel confident that the number of treatments performed at the
facility is a valid proxy for facility size. Finally, our research limited analysis to
the antecedents of chain acquisition because it was previously unexplored
within the dialysis industry, leaving the consequences of chain acquisition on
dialysis facility performance unanswered. However, preliminary analyses sug-
gest important benefits associated with chain acquisition over independent
ownership during the first 5 years after chain acquisition (Pozniak 2006).
Despite these caveats, our research suggests some important policy im-
plications. To the extent that dialysis chains are acquiring high-cost facilities that
might have otherwise had their clinical practices constrained by a poor financial
situation or even gone out of business, chain acquisition of independent facilities
could result in more efficient management, improved practice patterns, and
better clinical outcomes. Cost savings are especially salient for the dialysis pop-
ulation due to the high cost of treating dialysis patients.9 However, by acquiring
a facility in a less concentrated market, the dialysis chain can make inroads into
the market and gain market power by acquiring or building additional facilities.
Private insurers will feel the brunt of any chain monopolistic pricing behavior,
and chains with significant market power may also be detrimental for patients
by restricting their choice of providers.10 Furthermore, any policy intended to
affect dialysis chain growth needs to take into account different growth strategies
employed by differently sized or geographically located chains.
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NOTES
1. However, Medicare is the secondary payer up to 33 months after the onset of
ESRD for those patients who begin treatment with private health insurance.
2. Differences in payment occur based on facility setting (hospital-based facilities
receive slightly more than freestanding facilities), geographical area (over 50 per-
cent of the prospective payment is adjusted for differences in local labor costs), and,
starting in 2005, a limited set of patient characteristics (Office of the Federal
Register 2004).
3. Amgen was recently able to extend its patent for Epogen to 2016.
4. Although the vast majority of patients receive in-center hemodialysis, there are
other treatment modalities——including home hemodialysis, continuous ambula-
tory peritoneal dialysis, and continuous cycler-assisted peritoneal dialysis——which
can be performed at home.
5. The HHI uses the sum of the square of each firm’s market share (i.e., the dialysis
treatments performed at each facility) to determine market concentration. The
measure ranges from nearly zero, reflecting nearly perfect competition, to 10,000,
indicating a pure monopoly.
6. The 18 ESRD networks receive funds from local dialysis facilities to improve the
quality of care and are used instead of state or Census region because they are a
more meaningful geographic categorization for the dialysis industry.
7. However, because HCT values became increasingly higher per facility over time,
these missing values were computed using the mean of the previous and the fol-
lowing year.
8. Fifty-three chain-affiliated facilities became unaffiliated with a chain during the
study period. These facilities are considered chains for all periods subsequent to the
first period in which they report a chain affiliation (i.e., they do not re-enter the
model once they become independent).
9. Although only 1.1 percent of Medicare patients suffer from ESRD, they account for
7.4 percent of the Medicare budget, translating to over U.S.$22 billion in 2006
(U.S. Renal Data System 2008).
10. Although patients are free to change facilities, most stay at the facility to which they
were initially referred by their nephrologist due to the severity of their illness and
ties with their doctor.
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